observations in his separate opinion in the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros case, that the ability of Article 31(3)(c) to address relationships between treaty and custom "scarcely covers this aspect with the degree of clarity requisite to so important a matter". 7 It was not yet at the forefront of the ILC's agenda. In concluding that research eff ort, I proposed that Article 31(3)(c) be focused on as "an available tool", with the recognition that [s] hort of the International Law Commission providing greater clarity on its utilization-an unlikely prospect in the short term-it will be for judicial and quasi-judicial bodies to take the lead. No doubt for unrelated reasons, greater attention has been paid to the provision in recent years. International courts and tribunals have begun to focus on its requirements, occasionally invoking Article 31(3)(c);
9 the ILC has referred to it as part of its study on the fragmentation of international law;
10 and scholars and practitioners have also discussed it. 11 A signifi cant development -and perhaps even a tipping point -was the ICJ's judgment on the merits in the Oil Platforms case.
12 As noted by one commentator, the ICJ's judgment in Oil Platforms "has shone a searchlight onto one of the most neglected corners of the interpretation section of the Vienna Convention, namely Article 31(3)(c)".
13
Th e searchlight has identifi ed a number of diffi culties. In particular, despite the apparent quasi-unanimity on the principal legal issues before the Court in Oil Platforms (14-2, and 15-1, respectively), the eleven separate opinions, declarations and dissents refl ect a crucial diff erence of approach with respect to the relationship between interpretation and application under Article 31(3) (c). Th is is not surprising, since the scope of Article 31(3)(c) has long
